Abstract-This paper contributes to build a quantitative approach for digital identity assurance. We propose to use a hierarchical structure level to define the assurance level, taking weighted affiliation information into consideration for assurance level; thus creating a more practical assurance supporting model is designed for any digital identities. In doing this an accurate mathematical framework is constructed to calculate the exact assurance level for any digital identities. The paper contributes a concrete architecture of registration authority of digital identity associated with a hierarchical domain name structure for registration authority. The mechanism of assurance support for digital identities can be broadly applied in any federated digital identity management systems.
INTRODUCTION
The US Federal Trade Committee estimates that as many as 9 million Americans have their identities stolen each year. All countries, especially in the developed world, are concerned about identity fraud. The new generation Internet has brought a revolutionary solution to the problems in the conventional identity infrastructure. New generation identity infrastructure, digital identity infrastructure, will replace the current identity systems. Some leading security research communities are exploring this new arena, digital identity, which will lead to the building of a robust new generation identity infrastructure for our information age. VeryIDX [1, 2] is one of pioneer projects on digital identity. VeryIDX implements an electronic receipt infrastructure and supports protocols to build and manage user's online transaction history. The receipt protocols are shown to have several essential security and privacy properties. The architecture and prototype implementation of VeryIDX are designed to preserve identity holders' privacy without jeopardizing security with zero knowledge proofs. During the implementation, we find that digital identity enrolment and assurance are crucially important for building a robust digital identity infrastructure. Unfortunately we cannot find much useful literature for digital identity enrolment and assurance. We use our VeryIDX to address the issue on digital identity enrolment and assurance and further contribute to broad research communities on digital identity.
This rest of paper is organised as the follows. Section 2 will address the related work on digital identity. Section 3 will introduce our proposed evaluation framework for assessing digital identity risk. Section 4 will discuss the framework and classification of assurance level for digital identity. Section 5 describes the processes of digital identity enrolment. Section 6 will address the proofing procedures for digital identity registration. Section 7 will conclude the paper and suggest some new research dynamics for VeryIDX.
II. RELATED WORKS AND GOVERNMENTAL
FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL IDENTITY A model-based assurance framework for federated identity management systems was suggested in [5, 9] . The paper did raise the issue of the importance of digital identity assurance. However there were no details regarding to the proper mechanism for digital identity assurance for federated systems apart from a suggested framework and some conceptual policy wordings.
Based on Liberty Alliance Group [6] , there are four different assurance levels: Little or no confidence in the asserted identity's validity (LA 1); some confidence in the asserted identity's validity (LA 2); High confidence in the asserted identity's validity (LA 3); Very high confidence in the asserted identity's validity (LA 4). While there are no negative consequences which result from erroneous authentication, LA 1 can be used. When moderate risk is associated with erroneous authentication, LA 2 is needed for a digital identity system. When substantial risk is associated with erroneous authentication, LA 3 is needed for a digital identity system. When significant risk is associated with erroneous authentication, LA 4 is needed for acquiring very high confidence in an asserted digital identity.
The US Federal PKI Common Policy Framework [7, 10] requires five assurance levels: Rudimentary; Basic; Medium; Medium Hardware; High. Rudimentary provides the lowest degree of assurance concerning the identity of the individual. Basic provides a basic level of assurance relevant to any environments where there are risks and consequences of data compromise, but they are not considered to be of major significance. Medium is relevant to those environments where risks and consequences of data compromise are moderate.
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Medium Hardware is relevant to the selected environments where threats to data are high or the consequences of failing security services are high. This may include very high value transactions or high levels of fraud risk. High is reserved for cross-certification with government entities and is appropriate for those environments where the threats to data are high, or the consequences of failing security services are high.
Liberty Alliance Group defines four assurance levels which US Federal PKI Common Policy Framework requires five assurance levels. An obvious research question for our VeryIDX to be answered is how we define the assurance levels for our project. In order to find an objective answer to this question, we contribute an assessment framework for any digital identity systems in the next section.
III. DIGITAL IDENTITY RISK ASSESSMENT As OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation) [8] is a wide acceptable method for risk management of information assets, we use its basic concepts and definitions for digital identity risk assessment. ACTAVE presents a basic equation for risk assessment.
Threat (condition) + Impact (consequence) = Risk
Threat-Action or potential occurrence that breaches the security of the system by exploiting its known or unknown vulnerabilities.
Impact -The effect of a threat on an organization's mission and business objectives.
Risk -A risk is the possibility of suffering harm or loss. Risk refers to a situation where a person could do something undesirable or a natural occurrence could cause an undesirable outcome, resulting in a negative impact or consequence. A risk is composed of an event, a consequence and uncertainty.
In order to objectively find an effective risk measurement for information assets, OCTAVE defines Impact value and Risk measurement criteria.
Impact value -a qualitative measure of a specific risk's impact to the organization. Impact value is defined in three categories: high, medium and low.
Risk measurement criteria -a set of qualitative measures against which the effect of each risk on an organization's mission and business objectives is evaluated. Risk measurement criteria define ranges of high, medium, and low impacts for an organization from the perspectives, like Reputation/customer confidence, Financial, Productivity, Safety and health, Fines/legal penalties and other User-defined impact area.
Based on OCTAVE's method, we design an applicable risk measurement criteria set for digital identity. We illustrate the risk assessment of people-based digital identity as follows.
We denote a personal digital identity by Ƭ. ǉ is denoted as a set of personal credentials. Ã is denoted as a set of the perron's affiliation attributes. Õ is denoted as a set of personal family and society background.
Ƭ= {ǉ Ã Õ}
The name of Ƭ must be unique for all digital identity name space. In order to ensure the uniqueness of the name of digital identity, we design a tree-based hierarchy to manage the name system of digital identities [ Figure 1 ].
The root name domain (L0) is the highest digital identity name authority. The second level name domains (L1) must get an approval from L0 for their own autonomy name domains. The approval chain is as follows.
L0ĺL1ĺL2ĺL3ĺL4ĺ ··· ĺLn
Each individual name domain runs its own name space independently and gives its members a unique name within its governing boundary. When digital identity holder wants to communicate with others who are outside its home name domain, its parental name domain will automatically be added as its prefix. For an example, while Alice is in L21 name domain and another Alice is in T1 name domain [ Figure 1 ], Alice in L21 will have a name as L1.L21.Alice and Alice in T1 will have a name as Ln.T1.Alice. This mechanism makes sure the re-usability of names in the different domains and keeps all the names of digital identities unique across the whole name space.
As ǉ, Ã and Õ are three components of Ƭ, in order to further assess the risk of Ƭ , we need to further define the details of ǉ, Ã and Õ so that we can know their potential threats and impacts respectively. Based on relevant government legislation and industrial best practices, it is necessary that each element of ǉ, Ã and Õ will require a suitable weight. Like when you apply a bank card, Bank normally needs 100 points verification. Your passport is equivalent to 40 points. Your driving licence is equivalent to 30 points. Your utility bill is equivalent to 10 points. In order to get a bank card, you have to present your passport, driving licence and two utility bills to pass a hundred points test. We assume the weights are set as the follows. The total weighted values of ǉ, Ã and Õ are expressed respectively by the follows.
The average values of ǉ, Ã and Õ are followed. IV. ASSURANCE LEVEL Based on the parameters in the previous section, we can quantitatively define the digital identity assurance level. To our best knowledge so far there are only qualitative definitions for the digital identity assurance level. We still use a university hierarchy [ Figure 2 ] as an example to show our theory.
It is reasonable to define the assurance level based on the different layers in the hierarchy. Like in Figure 2 , there are five different assurance levels required for the university. The digital identities associated with the top hierarchy will need a high assurance level in the university while digital identities associated with the bottom hierarchy will need a low assurance level. Figure 2 only shows the possible assurance levels for a university. Normally one digital identity registration authority will govern many organisations within its reign domain.
Based on the digital identity domain hierarchy, we can similarly have a hierarchical structure of digital identity registration authorities (RA) as Figure 3 . Each RA has its own criteria to set its maximum possible accepted personal credentials, affiliation requirement and personal social relationships. Each RA will have to set a broad assurance level gauge for its governing domain. We assume one RA defines "y" number of different assurance levels for its domain. Now we can have the following expression.
B=T1/y
Now each different assurance level is connected with the required a certain value. The relationship is as the following table. As we mentioned earlier, different affiliations have different weights, for example, US homeland security agency will have a higher weight compared to a university. The exact weight of one organisation will be decided by relevant government classification requirement and becomes the initial configuration value for any RA. Now we define a parameter called organisational weight coefficient (WC). We assume that an organisation's absolute weight is W A. If an applicant's accumulated points from its credentials are m, the real points (RP) are used to decide its assurance level as the follows.
RP=WC*m RA will assign an assurance level for this applicant based on the value of RP. For example, if RP<B, then assurance level 0 will be assigned. If RP>=[(y-1)*B, the highest assurance level will be assigned to this applicant. If RP>y*B, the applicant will still be assigned the highest assurance level, but further actions will be required to authenticate the applicant's social relationships.
V. ENROLMENT PROCESSES The enrolment processes of digital identity are normally decided by a local security policy. The local security policy is managed by the local domain RA. The authority of the local domain RA is governed by its parental RA. The relationship is shown on Figure 4 . The exact enrolment processes are performed between digital identity applicants/ subscribers and the local RA as follows:
Step 1. Digital identity subscribers lodge an application for a digital identity request with its credentials.
Step 2. The local RA checks the supplied credentials and computes the assurance level and confirms the subscriber for further credentials if applicable.
Step 3. Subscriber supplies further requested credentials.
Step 4 The local RA verifies the credentials under its own repository. If its own repository can satisfy the verification requirement, the parental RA will not be involved in. If its own repository cannot satisfy the verification requirement, the parental RA will have to be involved in finalising the verification processes.
Step 5 If the verification processes are successful in Step 4, the local RA will issue a digital identity to the subscriber. If the verification processes are not successful in Step 4, the local RA will send a rejection notice to the subscriber.
VI. PROOF PROCEDURES A difference in assurance level decides the degree of complexity for the credential verification. Like we have discussed in Section 3, a digital identity can consist of three components: ǉ, Ã and Õ. For a low assurance level, the verification processes will only involve elements of ǉ. For a middle assurance level, the verification processes will involve the elements of ǉ and Ã. For a high assurance level, the verification will involve the elements of ǉ, Ã and Õ. Some good protocols [4] were suggested for privacy-enhancing verification of credentials. Here we focus on the proofing processes instead of these proofing techniques. The verification processes are involved in relevant certification authorities (CA). The requirements and structure of CAs are designed via the government or its agency via proper legislations. We assume that all CA are reliable and trustful. The communications between RA and CA are secure and robust. In Section 4, we introduced that the assurance level can be calculated in an exact figure and the figure can vary from system to system. In order to demonstrate the effective proofing processes, we apply three assurance levels: low, middle and high. Accordingly the proofing processes are illustrated by three different assurance levels: low, middle and High.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper contributes a quantitative approach for measuring digital identity assurance levels. The affiliation and social background information is introduced to further authenticate digital identity applicants. The hierarchical structure of an organisation is utilized to classify the assurance levels. An organisation's attributes are taken into account for the digital identity assurance level. The processes of digital identity enrolment are designed for any digital identity management system. We will extend the assurance mechanism into our current digital identity project, VeryIDX. The assurance support for digital identity is one of most important parts among the lifecycle of digital identity. As many developed countries are much interested in implementing their digital identity management systems, the future societies will depend more on the infrastructure of digital identity. More extensive research is expected to be conducted for all aspects of digital identity.
